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A "TIER-FUL" REVELATION: A PRINCIPLED APPROACH
TO SEPARATION OF POWERS
In Metropolitan Washington Airports Authority v. Citizens for
the Abatement of Aircraft Noise, Inc.,1 the Supreme Court used
formalist analysis to hold that Congress' transfer of operational
control over Washington National Airport and Dulles International
Airport to a joint authority comprised of Virginia and the District
of Columbia 2 was an unconstitutional violation of the principle of
separation of powers.3
The latest in a series of separation-of-powers cases,4 the Court's
decision appears to mark yet another about-face in an area of jurisprudence notable for its tortuousness. 5 Some commentators have
characterized the Court as indecisive in this area, criticizing, the
Court for
vacillat[ing] over the years between using a formalistic approach
to separation-of-powers issues grounded in the perceived necessity of maintaining three distinct branches of government (and
consequently appearing to draw rather sharp boundaries), and a
functional approach that stresses core function and relationship,
and permits a good deal of flexibility when these attributes are
not threatened.6

1. 111 S. Ct. 2298 (1991).

2. Metropolitan Washington Airports Act of 1986, 49 U.S.C. app. §§ 2451-2461 (1988).
3. Washington Airports Authority, 111 S. Ct. at 2301.
4. "Separation of powers has been a growth area of constitutional law in the 1970s and
1980s." Alan B. Morrison, A Non-Power Looks at Separation.of Powers, 79 GEO. L.J. 281,
281 (1990).
5. In contrast to Washington Airports Authority, which used formalist reasoning, the
Court in its two prior separation-of-power cases, Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988), and
Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361 (1989), had relied on functionalist analysis. See
infra text accompanying notes 132-44. Some scholars had concluded from Morrison and
Mistretta that the Court had finally ended the debate and was ready to adopt functionalism
as it exclusive method of analysis in separation of powers. See, e.g., Stephen L. Carter,
Framers Lost in Sentencing Cases, LEGAL TIMES, Jan. 30, 1989, at 21.
6. Peter L. Strauss, Formal and Functional Approaches to Separation-of-PowersQuestions-A Foolish Inconsistency?, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 488, 489 (1987) (footnotes omitted).
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The Court clearly demonstrated this inconsistency when, in two
separation-of-powers cases decided on the same day, the same five
Justices7 who held in Bowsher v. Synar' that formalist analysis
was applicable then held in Commodity Futures Trading Commission v. Schor9 that functionalism was the appropriate approach.
Although the Court's lack of adherence to a single method has
been a source of frustration for many commentators," only the
most single-minded approach could find that either formalism or
functionalism alone would suffice for deciding all separation-ofpowers cases." Moreover, to believe that each branch is of equal
strength, and therefore that each branch's encroachments are
equally dangerous, is naive.' 2
This Note argues that both functionalism and formalism are
necessary to cope with the myriad separation-of-powers problems
that come before the courts, and it proposes a system for determining when to use each approach. To date the Supreme Court
has failed to articulate a unifying theory that indicates when each
method of analysis is appropriate, leading to an unprincipled coexistence of functionalism and formalism. As Professor Strauss has
noted, "[C]lear rules contribute to planning, stability, even assurance that conduct can and will be governed by law.' 3 By clearly
articulating its reasons for choosing functionalism or formalism

7. The five Justices were Chief Justice Burger and Justices Rehnquist, Powell,
O'Connor, and Stevens.
8. 478 U.S. 714 (1986); see infra text accompanying notes 115-22.
9. 478 U.S. 833 (1986); see infra text accompanying notes 123-31.
10. Compare Earl C. Dudley, Jr., Morrison v. Olson: A Modest Assessment, 38 Am U. L.
REv. 255 (1989) (advocating a functionalist approach) with Lee S. Liberman, Morrison v.
Olson: A Formalistic Perspective on Why the Court Was Wrong, 38 AM. U. L. REv. 313
(1989) (supporting a formalist approach). But see Strauss, supra note 6, at 512 ("Identifying
a satisfactory principle for assessing the permissibility of distributions of governmental
power, much less one that can be rooted in the 'separation-of-powers' framework, may simply be too much to expect.") (footnote omitted).
11. See infra text accompanying notes 20-33, 39-50 (discussing the weaknesses inherent in
each method of analysis).
12. For example, encroachments by the judiciary upon the executive branch may not necessarily be so dangerous as encroachments by the legislature upon the executive. See infra
notes 159-67 and accompanying text.
13. Strauss, supra note 6, at 512. Professor Strauss also warns, however, that "such rules
present the twin hazards of inflexibility in the face of changing and unpredictably varying
circumstances, and of inviting evasion by their clarity." Id. This Note, by advocating a twotier method of separation-of-powers analysis, as opposed to a single method, attempts to
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m future cases, the Supreme Court will provide the nation's
lawmakers with important guidance; the Court must determine
which legislative goals are permissible so that Congress will not
have to use precious time and resources attempting to enact laws
that cannot withstand separation-of-powers scrutiny 14
In fact, the Court actually has been very consistent in determining when to use either formalism or functionalism. Unfortunately,
it has often failed to explaui its reasoning. This Note articulates
the principles underlying the Court's choices, beginning with a discussion of the Court's two approaches to separation-of-powers
questions-formalism and functionalism-which focuses on the
problems inherent in each method. The Note then analyzes the
Court's reasoning in a wide variety of separation-of-powers cases,
demonstrating the degree to which the Court has repeatedly vacillated between formalism and functionalism.
The next section then advocates a two-tier approach to separation of powers that uses formalism and functionalism, but in a
principled fashion. By looking at original intent and examining the
potential danger that each branch poses, this Note shows that the
legislature poses the greatest threat to the principles underlying
separation of powers and that legislative aggrandizement should
therefore be subject to formalist analysis, the more rigorous tier.
Conversely, executive or judicial aggrandizement is much less dangerous, and therefore should be subject to functionalist scrutiny,
the less rigorous tier. The two-tier approach provides a unifying
theory that is consistent with the purposes of separation of powers
while recognizing the structure of modern government. The Note
supports this contention by examining the Court's decisions in the
context of the two tiers to demonstrate that the Court has been

provide guidance as to the appropriate standard while simultaneously providing flexibility
sufficient to meet the various problems that may arise.
14. Certainly, Congress could not become more confused by the Court's vacillation. In
recent years, for example, the Court has invalidated the legislative veto, putting in doubt
the constitutionality of almost 200 statutes, id. at 489 (citing INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919
(1983)), and "rejected Congress's effort to discipline itself from adding to the burgeoning
national debt." Id. (citing Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714 (1986)). At the same time, the
Court has permitted Congress to create an independent prosecutor authorized to investigate
and prosecute high-ranking government officials, see Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988),
and a commission to promulgate mandatory sentencing guidelines, see Mistretta v. United
States, 488 U.S. 361 (1989).
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using two-tier analysis in a principled manner all along. The Note
concludes that the Court should explicitly adopt the two-tier
approach.
THE SUPREME COURT'S TRADITIONAL APPROACHES TO
SEPARATION-OF-POWERS ANALYSIS

Formalism
Formalism presumes that the Constitution divides government
into three separate branches in order to prevent all power from
accruing within one branch-"the very definition of tyranny "I' To
remain faithful to this rationale for separation of powers, the legislature may exercise only those powers characterized as legislative,
the executive branch may only execute laws, and the judiciary may
only adjudicate.16 Only where the Constitution expressly provides
17
for exceptions may the branches cross their boundaries.
Justice Black's opinion for the Court in Youngstown Sheet &
Tube Co. v. Sawyer"s epitomizes the formalists' literal interpretation of the Constitution:
In the framework of our Constitution, the President's power
to see that the laws are faithfully executed refutes the idea that
he is to be a lawmaker. The Constitution limits his functions in
the lawmaking process to the recommending of laws he thinks
wise and the vetoing of laws he thinks bad. And the Constitution is neither silent nor equivocal about who shall make laws
which the President is to execute. The first section of the first
article says that "All legislative Powers herein granted shall be
")19
vested in a Congress of the United States
Formalism is thus very mechanical; if a branch, or an agency
within its control, exercises any other branch's powers except
where expressly permitted by the Constitution, then that branch
has encroached upon the other branch and has necessarily violated
15. THE FEDERALIST No. 47, at 246 (James Madison) (Max Beloff ed., 2d ed. 1987).
16. Michael L. Yoder, Note, Separation of Powers: No Longer Simply Hanging in the
Balance, 79 Gao. L.J. 173, 173 (1990).
17. Id. For instance, the Constitution, by expressly authorizing the Senate to try impeachments, permits Congress to exercise a judicial power. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 6.
18. 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
19. Id. at 587-88 (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1).
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the separation of powers. However, if one believes that today the
administrative state20 is not only a reality but a necessity, 21 then
formalism appears to be hopelessly incompatible with modern government. Applying only formalist analysis to the administrative
state, one must conclude that almost every administrative agency
is unconstitutional because virtually every agency exercises legislative, executive, and judicial powers.2 2 In other words, the executive
branch, which ostensibly controls many federal agencies,2 encroaches upon the legislature each time an agency enacts a regulation, and it encroaches upon the judiciary each time an agency adjudicates a dispute. Thus, the executive branch violates the
separation of powers virtually every time an agency acts.
The argument that certain agencies are immune to the formalist/
functionalist debate because they are independent of the executive
branch and constitute a "fourth branch" 24 is equally untenable
under formalism. Such an argument places the agencies "beyond
the constitutional text, ' 25 a clear violation of the Constitution's
mandate that government operate within the scope of the three
branches. Moreover, even if one believes that the Constitution permits a fourth branch, the fact that the agencies within this branch
exercise more than one type of power violates the Framers' intent
of keeping the branches separate so that power would not accrue in
one branch.2 6

20. For discussion of.the modern federal government's structure and methods of law administration, see generally Peter L. Strauss, The Place of Agencies in Government: Separation of Powers and the Fourth Branch, 84 COLUM. L. REv. 573 (1984).
21. See Bernard Schwartz, Curiouserand Curiouser:The Supreme Court'sSeparation of
Powers Wonderland, 65 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 587, 601 (1990) ("[lIndependent agencies have
become an essential part of modern government.").
22. Strauss, supra note 6, at 492-93. Agencies such as
the Securities and Exchange Commission
exercise[] all three of the governmental functions the Constitution so carefully allocates among Congress,
President, and Court. These agencies adopt rules having the shape and impact
of statutes, mold governmental policy through enforcement decisions and other
initiatives, and decide cases in ways that determine the rights of private
parties.
Id.
23. See Strauss, supra note 20, at 587 ("[T]he legal regime within which agencies function
is highly unified under presidential direction.").
24. Strauss, supra note 6, at 495.
25. Id.
26. See THE FEDERALIST No. 47, supra note 15, at 245-46.
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Essentially, if the Supreme Court rigidly adhered to formalist
analysis, it would have to hold most independent agencies unconstitutional and the United States government could not exist in its
current form.2" Under formalist scrutiny, the fact that the administrative state has developed because it "is efficient, convenient, and
useful in facilitating functions of the government, standing alone,
will not save it if it is contrary to the Constitution. Convenience
and efficiency are not the primary objectives-or the hallmarks-of democratic government
,,,8 An end to the administrative state may be difficult for us to conceive. Certainly, the
Court did not wish to envision such a scenario, which may explain
why it took great pains explicitly to point out that its formalist
decision in Bowsher v. Synar"9 did not apply to independent agencies.3 0 The Court's position, however, while protecting the structure of modern government from further erosion, did little to clarify the paradox inherent in its separation-of-powers jurisprudence.
Ultimately, criticism of formalism stems from the belief that
"three rather strictly separated governmental branches cannot cooperate to produce permanently viable administrative governance
for a modern society "31 For example, Congress alone, saddled with
the cumbersome legislative process, could not possibly enact legislation that would sufficiently meet all the needs of today's complex

27. See Dudley, supra note 10, at 271 (commenting favorably on the Court's adoption of a
functionalist approach in Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988), because adoption of formalism "at this point in our history [is]
likely to revolutionize the conduct of
government").
28. INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 944 (1983).
29. 478 U.S. 714 (1986).
30. Id. at 725 n.4. During Bowsher's oral arguments, when the Solicitor General stated
that proponents of the Gramm-Rudman Act, 2 U.S.C. §§ 901-922 (Supp. III 1982), were
merely trying to "scare" the Justices with the argument that upholding the lower court's
formalist decision would endanger independent agencies such as the Federal Trade Commission and the Federal Reserve Board, Justice O'Connor replied, "They scared me with it."
Schwartz, supra note 21, at 603 (emphasis added); see also Stephen L. Carter, The Independent Counsel Mess, 102 HARV. L. REv. 105, 132 (1988) (noting that even Justice Scalia,
the Court's foremost formalist, was "reluctant" to hold that the administrative state was
unconstitutional).
31. Frederick R. Anderson, Revisiting the Constitutional Status of the Administrative
Agencies, 36 AM. U. L. REv. 277, 279 (1987); see also Strauss, supra note 6, at 511-12 ("The
government we have built and now live with has attained a complexity and intermarriage of
function that beggars the rationalistic tripartite schemes of the eighteenth century.").
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economy.32 Similarly, by permitting administrative agencies to settle disputes involving interpretation of the agencies' own regulations, Congress has relieved the judicial branch of the burden of
handling every dispute requiring adjudication. 3 Strict adherence
to formalist analysis could thus undermine the legislature's efforts
to cope with an increasingly complex world.
Functinalism
The Court's other approach to separation of powers is functionalism. Professor Lee Liberman states that a functionalist approach
starts with the assumption that all exercises of power cannot be
characterized as falling under one of the three headings and that
the Constitution does not require them to do so. Rather, the
vesting clauses allocate power only among the three principal actors-Congress, the President, and the Supreme Court-but
permit all other governmental actors to exercise combined powers in whatever mixture Congress may prescribe under the necessary and proper clause, so long as Congress' choice does not
interfere with the performance of its "core functions" by one of
the named actors. 4

On several occasions, in explicitly adopting functionalism, the
Court "rejected the argument that the Constitution contemplates a
complete division of authority between the three branches."3 5
Rather, the Court held, the Framers created three separate
branches, but not with the belief that the branches should "have
32. See Richard B. Stewart, Beyond Delegation Doctrine, 36 Am. U. L. REv. 323, 331
(1987) ("The demands on Congress' agenda far exceed its capacity to make collective decisions. Securing agreement by a majority of 435 representatives, a majority of 100 senators,
and the President is typically an arduous, time-consuming, and difficult process.").
33. Strauss, supra note 6, at 493.
34. Liberman, supra note 10, at 343 (footnote omitted). "Core function" is a term commentators have used to paraphrase the Court's expression, "constitutionally assigned functions," Nixon v. Administrator of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 443 (1977) (citing United States
v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 711-12 (1974)). See, e.g., Peter L. Strauss, Was There a Baby in the
Bathwater?A Comment on the Supreme Court'sLegislative Veto Decision, 1983 DuKE L.J.
789, 803-04 (discussing Justice Powell's approach to core notions of legislative function in
INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983)); see also In re Sealed Case, 838 F.2d 476, 526 (D.C.
Cir.) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (discussing whether the law at issue tampered with a " 'core'
executive function"), rev'd sub nom. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988).
35. Nixon, 433 U.S. at 443.
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no partil agency in, or no controul over the acts of each other." 6
Instead, their intent was only to prevent " 'the whole power of one
department [from being] exercised by the same hands which possess the whole power of another department.' ,,37 Thus, functionalism permits structural relationships that do not rigidly adhere to
branch boundaries, so long as they do not overly shift the balance
of power toward one branch. 8
A purely functionalist approach to separation of powers, however, is fraught with as many dangers as a purely formalist approach. First, functionalism replaces the Constitution's explicit
grants and limitations of power with a balancing test. As one commentator has stated, "While 'core function' may be the best that
the most sophisticated of the analysts can suggest, it has no stable
content." 9 This has led to fears that strict adherence to functionalism will lead to courts' engaging in "ad hoc balancing"40 even
when the Constitution explicitly proscribes an encroachment
4
across branch lines. '
Second, functionalism undermines another purpose of separation
of powers: ensuring accountability of the government to the peo-

36. Id. at 442 n.5 (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 47, at 325-26 (James Madison) (Jacob E.
Cooke ed., 1961)).
37. Id. (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 47, supra note 36, at 325-26).
38. Mary Buffington, Comment, Separation of Powers and the Independent Governmental Entity After Mistretta v. United States, 50 LA. L. REv. 117, 123 (1989).
39. Strauss, supra note 6, at 513 (footnote omitted). Justice Scalia phrased the concern
succinctly:
What are the standards to determine how the balance is to be struck, that is,
[for example,] how much removal of Presidential power is too much? Many
countries of the world get along with an executive that is much weaker than
ours-in fact, entirely dependent upon the continued support of the legislature. Once we depart from the text of the Constitution, just where short of that
do we stop?
Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 711 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting); see also Harold H. Bruff,
On the Constitutional Status of the Administrative Agencies, 36 AM. U. L. REv. 491, 509
(1987) ("Focusing only on whether a branch is disrupting the core functions of another
would result in a much more mixed set of outcomes than does formalism.").
40. Yoder, supra note 16, at 182.
41. Id. The danger is that the explicit system created by "the wise men who constructed
[the] two centuries of history that have shown it to be sound" will be
our system, and
replaced by whatever a majority of the Court, at a given time, happens to believe is sufficient to maintain an adequate system of checks and balances. Morrison, 487 U.S. at 734
(Scalia, J., dissenting).
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ple.42 The Constitution ensures "that those whom we elect as
lawmakers will actually make the fundamental policy choices.
When elected officials do not make these fundamental choices, but
instead delegate them, .
the people do not receive the representative, accountable government to which they are entitled. ' 43
In the present administrative structure, some accountability remains because the President, an elected official, generally retains
the power to appoint4 4 and remove4 agency heads. Thus, the President can appoint administrators who will run their agencies in accordance with Presidential policies, and he can remove administrators who abuse their discretion. Accountability exists because the
President is an elected official who remains sufficiently identified
with the actions of such agencies to present a target to citizens
46
displeased with an agency's actions.
Under a purely functionalist system, however, Congress would
be free to insulate an agency from the President's removal power.
For instance, the Court could uphold a law giving Congress the exclusive power to remove the head of an executive agency, on the
ground that such a small infringement upon the executive branch's
removal power would have little impact on the President's overall
ability to execute the laws.4 7 Such a holding would greatly attenuate the agencies' accountability to elected officials, because "the removal authority represents the only formal means by which Presi-

42. Liberman, supra note 10, at 345.
43. Morrison, supra note 4, at 299-300.
44. See, e.g., 47 U.S.C. § 154(a) (1988) ("The Federal Communications Commission
shall be composed of five commissioners appointed by the President,by and with the advice
and consent of the Senate
") (emphasis added).
45. See Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 117 (1926) (holding that only the President
has the power to remove executive officers).
46. Harold J. Krent, Fragmenting the Unitary Executive: CongressionalDelegations of
Administrative Authority Outside the Federal Government, 85 Nw. U. L. R.v. 62, 74
(1990).
47. See, e.g., Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 763 (1986) (White, J., dissenting). Justice
White, the Court's leading functionalist, would have upheld a law giving Congress, and not
the President, the power to remove the Comptroller General, an executive officer. Id.
Another method of insulating an agency from the President's removal power, and hence,

from public accountability, is the delegation of executive power to agencies outside the federal government. See Krent, supra note 46.
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dents can control their subordinates'
ongoing exercise of power and
4' s
ensure unified execution of law."
The danger would then be the creation of
all manner of "expert" bodies, insulated from the political process, to which Congress will delegate various portions of its lawmaking responsibility. How tempting to create an expert Medical Commission
to dispose of such thorny, "no win"
political issues as the withholding of life-support systems in federally funded hospitals, or the use of fetal tissue for research. 49
Thus, despite commentators' calls for uniform application of either formal or functional analysis by the Court, rigid adherence to
a particular approach would create many problems. Perhaps for
this reason, the Court has abstained from relying exclusively on
either formalism or functionalism, alternating instead between the
two in what has sometimes appeared to be random fashion. 0
THE. SEPARATION-OF-POWERS CASES

Myers v. United States
The first modern separation-of-powers case using explicit formalist analysis was Myers v. United States.5 1 In Myers, the President removed a postmaster from office without consulting the Senate, despite a statute that required the President to obtain the
Senate's advice and consent before he could remove a postmaster. 52 Chief Justice Taft, writing for the majority, adopted a formalist position, holding that
the Constitution was so framed as to vest in the Congress all
legislative powers therein granted, to vest in the President the
executive power, and to vest in one Supreme Court and such
inferior courts as Congress might establish, the judicial power.
From this division on principle, the reasonable construction of
the Constitution must be that the branches should be kept separate in all cases in which they were not expressly blended,
48. Krent, supra note 46, at 73.
49. Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 422 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
50. Cf. Bruff, supra note 39, at 505 ("[Tlhe Court's choice of analytic approach may be
result-oriented.").
51. 272 U.S. 52 (1926).
52. Id. at 106-07 (citing Act of July 12, 1876, ch. 179, 19 Stat. 80, 81).
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and the Constitution should be expounded to blend them no
53
more than it affirmatively requires.
The Court then interpreted the removal power as an essential
part of the President's executive powers, relying on the Vesting
Clause, 4 Appointments Clause, 55 and "Take Care" Clause. 6 First,
it held that the power of the President to remove his officers was a
necessary corollary of his executive powers, because the President
could not execute the laws unless he had the power to discipline
those assistants who failed to follow his orders. 57 Second, it recognized "that as a constitutional principle the power of appointment
carried with it the power of removal. 5'1 Third, the Court held that
"when the grant of the executive power is enforced by the express
mandate to take care that the laws be faithfully executed, it emphasizes the necessity for including within the executive power as
conferred the exclusive power of removal." 59 Therefore, because
the removal power resided exclusively with the President, Congress' attempt to limit that power represented a legislative encroachment upon the executive branch, an act which violated the
Constitution's separation of powers.60
Humphrey's Executor v. United States
Myers seemed to establish that at least a majority of the Justices
had adopted a formalist stance. Yet, in Humphrey's Executor v.
United States,61 a unanimous Supreme Court used functionalist
analysis to uphold a Congressional limitation of the President's
right to remove an agency official. Humphrey's Executor involved
a law that allowed the President to remove a commissioner of the
53. Id. at 116 (emphasis added).
54. "The executive Power shall be vested in a President of the United States of America."
U.S. CONST. art. II,-§ 1,cl. 1.
55. "[The President] shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of the
Senate, shall appoint
all other Officers of the United States, whose Appointments are
not herein otherwise provided for, and which shall be established by Law
"Id. § 2, cl.
2.
56. "[The President] shall take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed
"Id. § 3.
57. Myers, 272 U.S. at 135.
58. Id. at 119.
59. Id. at 122.
60. Id. at 176.
61. 295 U.S. 602 (1935).
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Federal Trade Commission only for " 'inefficiency, neglect of duty,
or malfeasance in office.' "162
The Court distinguished Humphrey's Executor from Myers by
holding that the agency was not an executive body, characterizing
it instead as a "quasi-legislative or quasi-judicial" agency 63 "To
the extent that it exercises any executive function-as distinguished from executive power in the constitutional sense-it does
so in the discharge and effectuation of its quasi-legislative or
quasi-judicial powers
"164 Therefore, the President's "illimitable power of removal '6 5 was not applicable, and Congress was free
to dictate the terms of removal for such agency officers. s6
By refusing to place the FTC into one of the three prescribed
branches of government and by permitting such agencies to exercise executive as well as legislative or judicial powers, the Court
was engaging in functionalist analysis. Moreover, by asking
whether the removal provisions would restrict the President's
power to execute the laws, 7 the Supreme Court was questioning
whether the statute interfered with a branch's core function, an
inquiry central to functionalist analysis.6 8 Characterizing the presidential power to execute the laws in terms of the ability to remove
executwe officers, the Court concluded that the statute did not impair the President's ability to remove executive officers and thus
did not affect a core executive function. 9
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer
In 1952 the Court decided Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v.
Sawyer,7 0 striking down a presidential attempt to seize steel mills

62. Id. at 619-20 (quoting Federal Trade Commission Act, ch. 311, § 1, 38 Stat. 717, 718
(1914) (current version at 15 U.S.C. § 41 (1988)).
63. Id. at 628.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 629.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 631.
68. See Strauss, supra note 6, at 512 (characterizing core-function analysis as central to
the Court's functionalist decision in Commodity Futures Trading Commission v. Schor, 478
U.S. 833 (1986)); see also supra text accompanying note 6 (stating that functionalism
stresses core function and relationship).
69. Humphrey's Executor, 295 U.S. at 631.
70. 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
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during the Korean War. This case presented a unique situation:
different members of the majority applied formalist and functionalist analysis but arrived at the same conclusion. 7 ' Justice Black,
writing for the majority, used purely formalist reasoning, holding
that "[i]n the framework of our Constitution, the President's
power to see that the laws are faithfully executed refutes the idea
that he is to be a lawmaker. 7 2 Authorizing the seizures was- a
purely legislative function, however, and "[t]he Founders of this
Nation entrusted the lawmaking power to the Congress alone
M3 Therefore, because no legislation expressly or implicitly
authorized the President to seize such property, 4 and because no
provision of the Constitution authorized such actions by the executive,75 the executive usurpation of legislative powers was unconstitutional.
In a concurring opinion, Justice Jackson applied functionalist
analysis in joining the majority's conclusion that the President's
actions were unconstitutional. He criticized the majority for seeking to define the powers of each branch from "isolated clauses or
even single Articles torn from context. '7 6 Instead, he argued that
the Constitution intended "that practice will integrate the dispersed powers into a workable government. It enjoins upon its
branches separateness but interdependence, autonomy but reciprocity Presidential powers are not fixed but fluctuate, depending
' 77
upon their disjunction or conjunction with those of Congress.
Despite his flexible approach to the separation of powers, Justice
Jackson agreed with the majority that the President's actions were
unconstitutional.7s He held that permitting the President to act
outside the scope of executive powers expressly granted by the
Constitution and directly against Congress' implicit intent would

71. Id.
72. Id. at 587.
73. Id. at 589.
74. Id. at 585.
75. The Court held that the Commander-in-Chief Clause, U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1,
was not so broad that it enabled the President to seize private property in order to prevent
a strike. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 587.
76. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 635 (Jackson, J., concurring).
77. Id.
78. Id. at 638.
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place enough power within the executive branch to upset "the
'79
equilibrium established by our constitutional system.
Buckley v. Valeo
Buckley v. Valeo80 was another case in which a majority of the
Court utilized formalist analysis. Buckley involved the constitutionality of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, as
amended in 1974,81 which created an eight-member Federal Election Commission to oversee federal elections. Two members of the
Commission were appointed by the President pro tempore of the
Senate, and two members were appointed by the Speaker of the
House of Representatives.8 2 Among the Commission's powers was
the authority to impose sanctions on those who violated the Act or
regulations made pursuant to the Act.8 3
The per curiam opinion used a formalist approach, characterizing the Commission's powers as executive in nature, because "[a]
lawsuit is the ultimate remedy for a breach of the law, and it is to
the President, and not to the Congress, that the Constitution entrusts the responsibility to 'take Care that the Laws be faithfully
executed.' ",84 Accordingly, the Court held that the Commission
must be an executive body, and therefore the selection of its members must comply with the requirements of the Appointments
Clause. 85 Because the statute authorized the President to select
only two of this executive body's eight members,88 the Court held
that Congress was encroaching upon the executive's appointment
powers, and thus the Act violated separation of powers. 7

79. Id.
80. 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam).
81. 2 U.S.C. §§ 431-456 (Supp. IV 1970).
82. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 113 (citing 2 U.S.C. § 437c(a)(1)(A)-(B)).
83. Id. at 111-12 (citing 2 U.S.C. § 437g(a)(5)-(7)).
84. Id. at 138 (quoting U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3).
85. Id. at 140-41.
86. 2 U.S.C. § 437c(1)(C).
87. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 143.
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Nixon v. Administrator of General Services
The Supreme Court returned to functionalist analysis, however,
in Nixon v. Administrator of General Services.88 The case concerned a determination of whether the Presidential Recordings and
Materials Preservation Act 9 violated the separation of powers.90
The Act directed the Administrator of the General Services Administration to take custody of President Nixon's papers and tape
recordings and determine which ones could be made public.91
The President contended that the statute interfered with the
presidential prerogative to control internal operations of the Executive Office and that it therefore offended the autonomy of the executive branch.92 Justice Brennan, writing for the majority, rejected these arguments, stating that the Constitution did not
create "three airtight departments of government."93 Rather, "in
determining whether the Act disrupts the proper balance between
the coordinate branches, the proper inquiry focuses on the extent
to which it prevents the Executive Branch from accomplishing its
'9 4
constitutionally assigned functions.

The Court then held that the possibility that presidential communications might be disclosed would not "adversely affect the
ability of future Presidents to obtain the candid advice necessary
for effective decisionmaking. ' ' 95 Thus, although a legislative act re-

stricted the executive branch's freedom to execute laws, the Act
did not prevent the President from proceeding with his constitutionally mandated executive powers, and therefore the Court upheld the statute.

88. 433 U.S. 425 (1977).
89. Pub. L. No. 93-526, §§ 101-106, 88 Stat. 1695 (1974).
90. Nixon, 433 U.S. at 429.
91. Id. at 433-35 (citing Pub. L. No. 93-526, §§ 101-104, 88 Stat. at 1695-98).
92. Id. at 439-41.
93. Id. at 443.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 450. The Court went on to say that it had no reason "to believe that the restriction on public access ultimately established by regulation will not be adequate to preserve
executive confidentiality." Id.
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Northern Pipeline Constructin Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co.
The Supreme Court returned to formalist analysis once again in
96
Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co.
Justice Brennan, writing for three other members of the Court,
struck down procedural aspects of the Bankruptcy Act of 1978,11
which granted United States Bankruptcy Courts "jurisdiction over
all 'civil proceedings arising under title 11 [the Bankruptcy title]
or arising in or related to cases under title 11" ,,9Under the Act,
bankruptcy judges were appointed for fourteen-year terms,9 could
be removed by the judicial council of the circuit on account of "incompetency, misconduct, neglect of duty, or physical or mental
disability," 10 0 and had salaries subject to adjustment under the
Federal Salary Act.' 0 '
The plurality held that the Framers had sought to insure an independent judiciary by instituting the Good Behavior Clause, 0 2
which "guarantees that Art. III judges shall enjoy life tenure, subject only to removal by impeachment," 10 3 and the Compensation
Clause, 0 4 which "guarantees Art. III judges a fixed and irreducible
compensation for their services."' 105 After establishing that bankruptcy courts were Article III courts because "the Act vests all 'essential attributes' of the judicial power of the United States in the
'adjunct' bankruptcy court[s] ,"106 the plurality found the Act to be
unconstitutional because it did not give bankruptcy judges all of
the protections guaranteed Article III judges by the Constitution.1 " Under the Act, the legislature could have exerted upon

96. 458 U.S. 50 (1982) (plurality opinion).
97. Pub. L. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (1978) (codified in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.).
98. Northern Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 54 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1471(b) (Supp. IV 1976))
(alteration in original).
99. 28 U.S.C. § 153(a).
100. Id. § 153(b).
101. Id. § 154; see Federal Salary Act, 2 U.S.C. §§ 351-361 (Supp. IV 1976).
102. "The Judges, both of the supreme and inferior Courts, shall hold their Offices during
good Behaviour
" U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
103. Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 59 (1982).
104. "The Judges
shall, at stated Times, receive for their Services, a Compensation,
which shall not be diminished during their Continuance in Office." U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
105. Northern Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 59.
106. Id. at 84-85.
107. Id. at 60.
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courts exercising the judicial power of the United States a degree
of influence not anticipated by the Framers; thus, the Court held
that the terms of the Act violated the principle of separation of
powers.
INS v. Chadha
In INS v. Chadha,1°8 the Court used formalist analysis to strike
down the use of legislative vetoes as a violation of separation of
powers.1" 9 At issue in Chadha was a provision of the Immigration
and Nationality Act"10 that gave Congress the power to veto, by
resolution of one house of Congress, any actions taken by the Attorney General pursuant to the Act."'
Writing for the majority, Chief Justice Burger began by characterizmg legislative vetoes as exercises of legislative power because
they were actions "that had the purpose and effect of altering the
legal rights, duties and relations of persons
outside the legislative branch."' " 2 Accordingly, such an act was unconstitutional if it
did not comply with the Constitution's procedures for enacting legislation, because the process was designed to reinforce the separation of powers.
[T]he Framers were acutely conscious that the bicameral requirement and the Presentment Clauses would serve essential
constitutional functions. The President's participation in the
108. 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
109. Id. at 956. Typically, in a legislative veto,
Congress passes legislation on a subject that gives the president, or an executive agency, the power to enact regulations with the force of law if one or both
Houses of Congress do not take certain action. Pursuant to this method of
legislative enactment, Congress provides in a statute that the president or
other executive official must submit the proposed regulation to Congress.
Under one alternative, this proposal then will become law unless one House of
Congress (or both Houses, according to some statutes) by resolution affirmatively disapproves of the proposal. Under another form, the proposal only will
become law if one House of Congress (or alternatively, both Houses) affirmatively approves of the proposal.
JOHN E. NOWAK Er AL., CONSTITUTONAL LAW 264 (2d ed. 1983). For discussion of legislative
vetoes, see generally Jacob K. Javits & Gary J. Klein, Congressional Oversight and the
Legislative Veto: A Constitutional Analysis, 52 N.Y.U. L. Rav. 455 (1977).
110. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1503 (1976).
111. Chadha, 462 U.S. at 923 (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1254(c)(2)).
112. Id. at 952.
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legislative process was to protect the Executive Branch from
Congress and to protect the whole people from improvident
laws. The division of the Congress into two distinctive bodies
assures that the legislative power would be exercised only after
opportunity for full study and debate in separate settings. The
President's unilateral veto power, in turn, was limited by the
power of two thirds of both Houses of Congress to overrule a
veto thereby precluding final arbitrary action of one person. It
emerges clearly that the prescription for legislative action in
Art. I, § § 1, 7 represents the Framers'decision that the legislative power of the Federal Government be exercised in accord
with a single, finely wrought and exhaustively considered,
procedure.'13

Essentially, legislative vetoes would have permitted Congress "to
'
exercise what amounts to veto-proof lawmaking power," 114
because
they would have prevented the President from getting an opportunity to exercise his veto power, over legislative actions. The Court
thus struck down the legislative veto portion of the statute as an
unconstitutional violation of separation of powers.
Bowsher v. Synar
In Bowsher v. Synar,115 the Supreme Court again used formalist
analysis to strike down congressional action. The law at issue in
Bowsher was the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control
Act of 1985,111 which required the Comptroller General to review
deficit estimates and budget reduction calculations and then make
recommendations to the President. 17 Under the Act, only Congress, by joint resolution, could remove the Comptroller General

113. Id. at 951 (emphasis added). The "bicameral requirement" is found in the Constitution's requirement that "[a]ll legislative powers herein granted shall be vested in a congress
which shall consist of a senate and a house of representatives." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1
(emphasis added). The Presentment Clause consists of the provision stating that "[e]very
bill which shall have passed the house of representatives and the senate, shall, before it
become a law, be presented to the president of the United States." Id. § 7, cl. 2 (emphasis
added).
114. Schwartz, supra note 21, at 599.
115. 478 U.S. 714 (1986).
116. 2 U.S.C. §§ 901-922 (Supp. III 1982). The Act was popularly known as the GrammRudman-Hollings Act. Bowsher, 478 U.S. at 717.
117. 2 U.S.C. § 901(a)-(b).
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for permanent disability, inefficiency, neglect of duty, malfeasance,
commission of a felony, or conduct involving moral turpitude. 118 In
his majority opinion, Chief Justice Burger noted that the Comptroller General's duties entailed interpreting provisions of the Act
and exercising judgment concerning application of the Act. 119 Because "[i]nterpreting a law enacted by Congress to implement the
20
legislative mandate is the very essence of 'execution' of the law,'
the Chief Justice held that the Comptroller General was an executive officer. 12 ' The Act was therefore unconstitutional, because
once Congress makes its choice in enacting legislation, its participation ends. Congress can thereafter control the execution of its
enactment only indirectly-by passing new legislation. By placing the responsibility for execution of the Balanced Budget and
Emergency Deficit Control Act in the hands of an officer who is
subject to removal only by itself, Congress in effect has retained
control over the execution of the Act and has intruded into the
executive function. The Constitution does not permit such
intrusion.' 22
Commodity Futures Trading Commisswn v. Schor
The Court then returned to functionalist analysis in Commodity
Futures Trading Commission v. Schor,123 holding that the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC), an administrative
agency, had jurisdiction to decide common law counterclaims aris1 24
ing out of state law claims.
118. Bowsher, 478 U.S. at 728 (citing 31 U.S.C. § 703(e)(1)(B) (1982)). Congress could also
remove the Comptroller through impeachment. 31 U.S.C. § 703(e)(1)(A). Although the President could veto the joint resolution, Congress could override the veto with a two-thirds vote
in each House. Bowsher, 478 U.S. at 728 n.7.
119. Bowsher, 478 U.S. at 733.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 733-34.
123. 478 U.S. 833 (1986).
124. Id. at 857. Congress created the CFTC, 7 U.S.C. § 4a (1976), giving it broad power to
implement the Commodity Exchange Act, id. §§ 1-22. Schor, 478 U.S. at 836. To promote
efficient dispute resolution, the CFTC promulgated the regulation permitting it to decide
common law counterclaims arising out of state law claims. Id. at 837 (citing 17 C.F.R. § 1223(b)(2) (1983)).
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Justice O'Connor, writing for the majority-five members of
whom, including herself, had decided Bowsher v. Synar 125 that
same day on formalist grounds"' 6-stated that the Court should
view the separation-of-powers issue in this case by reference to the
purposes underlying Article III, with " 'practical attention to substance rather than doctrinaire reliance on formal categories.' ,127
Accordingly, instead of characterizing the CFTC as an executive or
legislative agency and then automatically striking down the enabling legislation because it permitted an executive agency to exercise a traditional judicial power, the Court considered such factors
as the degree to which Article III courts retained "essential attributes of judicial power, 12 8 the range and scope of Congress' delegation to the CFTC, and the concerns which had led Congress to
9
act."
Applying these criteria, the Court held that the congressional
delegation of power to the CFTC to adjudicate common law counterclaims was constitutional because the CFTC's jurisdiction was
too limited to constitute an unacceptable intrusion into the Article
III judiciary's province'3 and because the CFTC's jurisdiction did
not preclude district court jurisdiction. 3 ' Thus, although a nonArticle III court was authorized to exercise powers conceded by all
parties to belong to the judicial branch, under functionalist analysis the encroachment was not deemed great enough to violate separation of powers.
Morrison v. Olson
Similarly, in Morrison v. Olson,13 the Supreme Court used functionalist analysis to uphold Congress' creation of an "independent
counsel" to investigate and, if appropriate, prosecute high-ranking

125. 478 U.S. 714 (1986).
126. See supra notes 7-9 and accompanying text.
127. Schor, 478 U.S. at 848 (quoting Thomas v. Union Carbide Agric. Prods: Co., 473 U.S.
568, 587 (1985)).
128. Id. at 851.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 852.
131. Id. at 853.
132. 487 U.S. 654 (1988).
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government officals for criminal violations. 3 At issue in the case
was Congress' stipulation that the independent counsel could be
removed by the Attorney General, an executive officer, only for
good cause or physical or mental disability 134
Chief Justice Rehnquist's majority opinion held that the statutory provision restricting the Attorney General's power to remove
the independent counsel did not impermissibly interfere with the
President's exercise of his constitutionally appointed functions.13 5
The Chief Justice contrasted Morrison with Bowsher v. Synar,3 6
stating that here, Congress had not attempted to gain a role in the
removal of executive officials; instead, the Act "put [ ] the removal power squarely in the hands of the Executive Branch,"' 37
although it did somewhat limit the Executive's exercise of that
power. Therefore, applying a functionalist balancing of the importance of the Act against its infringement upon another branch, the
Court deemed that limiting the Attorney General's, and thus, the
executive branch's, removal power was essential in establishing the
independence necessary for an effective independent counsel. 38
Mistretta v. United States
3 9 continued the Court's functionalist
Mistretta v. United States"
trend, upholding the United States Sentencing Commission's
power to promulgate mandatory sentencing guidelines. 4 0 The separation-of-powers issue in Mistretta was whether Congress could
delegate a legislative function-the creation of mandatory sentencing guidelines-to a body that was partially composed of sitting
federal judges.' In other words, was the judiciary, by taking on
legislative powers, encroaching upon the legislative branch?

133. Id. at 660.
134. Id. at 663 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 596(a)(1) (Supp. V 1982)).
135. Id. at 692.
136. 478 U.S. 714 (1986).
137. Morrison, 487 U.S. at 686.
138. Id. at 693.
139. 488 U.S. 361 (1989).
140. Id. at 397.
141. The Commission was composed of seven members appointed by the President, three
of whom were to be sitting federal judges chosen from a list of six submitted by the Judicial
Conference. Id. at 368 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 991(a) (Supp. IV 1982)).
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Justice Blackmun's majority opinion rejected a formalist approach to separation of powers that would have held that members
of the judiciary may not legislate. Instead, he found "that the role
of the Commission in promulgating guidelines for the exercise of
that judicial function bears considerable similarity to the role of
this Court in establishing rules of procedure under the various enabling acts.' 1 42 Thus, because the Commission's functions paralleled
the Court's role in promulgating procedural rules, the Commission
was acting in a manner consistent with "a central element of the
'' 3
historically acknowledged mission of the Judicial Branch."14
Therefore, because the Act did not undermine the integrity of the
judiciary, and because it did not deprive either the executive or
legislative branch of its powers, the Court held that separation of
44
powers was not violated.
Metropolitan Washington Airports Authority v. Citizens for the
Abatement of Aircraft Noise, Inc.
Despite the Supreme Court's alleged adoption of functionalism
as its sole method of analysis after Morrison and Mistretta,4 5 the
Court in Metropolitan Washington Airports Authority v. Citizens
for the Abatement of Aircraft Noise, Inc. 46 struck down a law on
purely formalist grounds. 4 The statute at issue was the Metropolitan Washington Airports Act of 1986,148 which transferred operational control of Washington National Airport and Dulles International Airport from the federal government to the Metropolitan
Washington Airports Authority (MWAA),' 49 which was created by
a compact between Virginia and the District of Columbia. 50 The
Act also contained a provision creating a Board of Review, composed of nine Members of Congress serving in their individual ca-

142. Id. at 391.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 395-96.
145. See supra note 5 (noting that scholars such as Professor Carter believed that the
Court had exclusively adopted functionalism).
146. ill S. Ct. 2298 (1991).
147. Id. at 2301.
148. 49 U.S.C. app. §§ 2451-2461 (1988).
149. Washington Airports Authority, 111 S. Ct. at 2301.
150. Id. at 2302.
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that had veto
pacities as representatives of users of the airports,
151
MWAA.
the
by
made
decisions
any
over
power
In striking down the legislation, Justice Stevens' majority opinion first pointed out that although the Act specified "[t]hat the
Members of Congress who serve on the Board nominally serve 'in
their individual capacities, as representatives of users' of the airports," 152 clearly, they were "congressional agent[s] exercising federal authority for separation-of-power purposes.
'[S]eparationof-powers analysis does not turn on the labeling of an activity' ,,153
Once the Court had established that the Board's members were
also members of the legislature, characterizing the Board's functions as executive or legislative became irrelevant because "[i]f the
power is executive, the Constitution does not permit an agent of
Congress to exercise it. If the power is legislative, Congress must
exercise it in conformity with the bicameralism and presentment
requirements of Art. I, § 7 ,,154 In either case, the legislature was
seeking to exercise powers the Constitution had not accorded it,
55
and thus the Act violated separation of powers.1
A Two-TIER

APPROACH TO SEPARATION OF POWERS

A Justificationfor Two Tiers
Despite scholarly clamor for adherence to either formalism or
functionalism, 56 the Court should not abandon either approach.
Neither formalism or functionalism alone can sufficiently protect
the principles of separation of powers imbued in the Constitution' 57 while sufficiently accommodating the flexibility required by
today's modern government.15 8 Instead, a two-tier system, utilizing

151. Id. at 2303-04 (citing 49 U.S.C. app. § 2456(f))..
152. Id. at 2307 (quoting 49 U.S.C. app. § 2456(f)(1)).
153. Id. (quoting Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 393 (1989)).
154. Id. at 2312.
155. Id.
156. See supra note 10 and accompanying text (discussing various scholars' contentions
that the Court should adopt either approach exclusively).
157. See supra notes 36-50 and accompanying text (discussing the values that separation
of powers was designed to protect).
158. See supra notes 31-33 and accompanying text (discussing the complexity of modern
government).
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both formalism and functionalism in a principled manner, is
necessary
In fact, the Court's decisions have implicitly used a two-tier
standard of analysis, selecting formalism or functionalism on the
basis of which branch was being aggrandized. The Supreme Court
has always explicitly recognized that the Framers regarded the system of separated powers and checks and balances as a "self-executing safeguard against the encroachment of aggrandizement of one
branch at the expense of the other. ' 159 More importantly, the

Court has recognized that encroachment or aggrandizement by one
particular branch may be more dangerous than by the others,
pointing specifically to the "danger of encroachment 'beyond the
legislatwe sphere.' ',160 The understanding that self-aggrandizement by the legislative branch is more dangerous than aggrandizement of either the executive or judicial branch is the distinction
upon which the two-tier system turns.
The Most Feared Branch
The Supreme Court has long been aware that it should particularly fear legislative encroachment upon the other branches because the Framers were clear in their warnings: "[T]he tendency of
republican governments is, to an aggrandizement of the legislative,
at the expense of the other departments." ''
[I]n a representative republic where the executive magistracy is
carefully limited, both in the extent and the duration of its
power; and where the legislative power is exercised by an assembly
, which is sufficiently numerous to feel all the passions
which actuate a multitude; yet not so numerous as to be incapable of pursuing the objects of its passions by means which reason prescribes; it is against the enterprising ambition of this de159. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 122 (1976). The Framers believed that "[t]he accumulation of all powers, legislative, executive, and judiciary, in the same hands
may justly be
pronounced the very definition of tyranny." THE FEDERALIST No. 47, supra note 15, at 24546.
160. Metropolitan Washington Airports Authority v. Citizens for the Abatement of Aircraft Noise, Inc., 111 S. Ct. 2298, 2311 (1991) (emphasis added) (quoting THE FEDERALIST
No. 48, at 334 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961)).
161. THE FEDERALIST No. 49, at 259 (Alexander Hamilton or James Madison) (Max Beloff
ed., 2d ed. 1987).
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to indulge all their jealousy and
partment that the people ought
1 62
exhaust all their precautions.

Justice White argued, however, that in the modern world, the
Framers' fears were misplaced. As he stated in Washington Airports Authority,
[t]he majority attempts to clear the path for its decision by
stressing the Framers' fear of overweaning legislative authority.
It cannot be seriously maintained, however, that the basis for
fearing legislative encroachment has increased or even persisted
rather than substantially diminished. At one point Congress
may have reigned as the preeminent Branch, just as the Framers predicted.It does so no longer This century has witnessed a
vast increase in the power that Congress has transferred to the
Executive. Given this shift in the constitutional balance, the
163
Framers' fears of legislative tyranny ring hollow

Justice White was correct in pointing out that Congress had delegated much of its power to the other branches and thus was no
longer the creature feared by the Framers. Nonetheless, he was
asking the Court to rely on an extremely subjective standard: when
64
has a branch lost enough power that it is no longer to be feared?L
Moreover, and perhaps most tellingly, he based his rationale on
the present weak state of Congress, a state into which Congress
literally willed itself by delegating so much power to the various
agencies; Justice White ignored the awesome potential the legislative branch possesses should it choose to exercise its powers
fully 165
162. THE FEDERALIST No. 48, at 253 (James Madison) (Max Beloff ed., 2d ed. 1987).
163. Washington Airports Authority, 111 S.Ct. at 2317 n.3 (White, J., dissenting) (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
164. Compare Justice Scalia's argument that straying from the text of the Constitution
leads to a dangerously subjective standard. Supra note 39.
165. Certainly the Framers were under no illusion, stating that "[t]he legislative department derives a superiority in our governments from other circumstances. Its constitutional
powers being at once more extensive, and less suspectible of precise limits, it can, with the
greater facility, mask, under complicated and indirect measures, the encroachments which it
makes on the co-ordinate departments." THE FEDERALIST No. 48, supra note 162, at 253.
Madison's wariness was all the more remarkable because he made his statements before
modern interpretation of the Constitution expanded Congress' power far beyond anything
he might have anticipated. Compare THE FEDERALIST No. 45, at 237 (James Madison) (Max
Beloff ed., 2d ed. 1987) ("The powers delegated by the proposed constitution to the federal
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However, fearing what Congress could be, rather than what Congress is, is reasonable. Merely because the legislature has chosen to
give away much of its power does not mean that it could not take
much of that power back. 16 When the Framers invested the Constitution with its separation-of-powers principles, they were concerned with possible, not merely probable, abuse of power.' 7 For
the nation's highest court to be less protective of the Constitution's
structure simply because modern politics have-perhaps only temporarily' 6S-shifted the balance of power in government would be
to sacrifice the security provided by the Framers' protections for
the illusory security of contemporary legislative weakness.
The Two Tiers
In separation-of-powers jurisprudence, not all encroachments
or aggrandizements are equally dangerous. Therefore, the Court
should explicitly recognize a two-tier system of analysis for separation of powers. 69 When Congress, "the most dangerous branch,"'' 0
government, are few and defined.") with Joseph Lesser, The Course of Federalism in
America-An HistoricalOverview, in FEDERALISM: THE SHIFTING BALANCE 1, 8-11 (Janice C.
Griffith ed., 1989) (discussing the dramatic expansion of Congress' commerce, taxing, and
spending powers during the 20th century).
166. Congress has numerous options. For example, it can simply enact legislation terminating an independent agency. See, e.g., Victoria Slind-Flor, Congress Considers Sweeping
Revisions in Copyright Law, NAT'L L.J., Mar. 15, 1993, at 19, 27 (discussing H.R. 897, 103d
Cong., 1st Sess. (1993), which calls for the termination of the Copyright Royalty Tribunal,
an independent agency). Congress can also end specific agency programs by altering the
enabling legislation. See, e.g., H.R. 62, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. § 402 (1993) (requiring the
Federal Emergency Management Agency to end the Erosion-Threatened Structures Program). Finally, it can override agency actions in many ways. See generally Frederick M.
Kaiser, CongressionalAction to Overturn Agency Rules: Alternatives to the "Legislative
Veto," 32 ADMIN. L. REv. 667 (1981).
167. See THE FEDERALIST No. 48, supra note 162, at 253 (discussing the inherent superiority of the legislative branch over the executive and judicial branches).
168. A major transformation in Congress would not be unprecedented. In a recent article,
Professor Sargentich attributed the dominance of Congress during the late-19th century to a
"succession of relatively weak Presidents." Thomas 0. Sargentich, The Limits of the Parliamentary Critique of the Separation of Powers, 34 WM. & MARY L. REv. 679, 691 & n.72
(1993). The emergence of strong Presidents during the late-19th and early-20th centuries,
and corresponding restructuring within Congress, led to the modern ascendancy of the executive branch. Id. at 691 & n.77. Following this logic, a succession of weak Presidents could
again cause Congress to become the dominant branch of government.
169. The use of different levels of scrutiny in the same area of jurisprudence is fairly
common. For example, in equal protection cases, the Court has traditionally used three dif-
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seeks to aggrandize itself by exercising powers that the Constitution does not grant it, the Court should apply the stricter tier, formalist analysis. For example, if Congress gives itself the power to
appoint ambassadors to other countries, 1 1 then "formal scrutiny"' 17 2 of the legislation will be appropriate.
On the other hand, when the other branches are aggrandized,
the Court should use "functional scrutiny" because they do not
pose a threat to the balance of powers nearly so dangerous as legislative aggrandizement. For instance, if the executive branch is aggrandized through a delegation of power from Congress authorizing
an executive officer to enact certain regulations, then the Court
should review the enabling legislation using functionalist analysis
and thereby determine whether the executive branch now wields so
much legislative power that "the equilibrium established by our
constitutional system"'1 3 will be disrupted. Similarly, when the executive or judiciary aggrandizes itself by usurping another branch's
power, the Court should apply the functionalist tier to the aggrandizement, balancing the encroaching branch's need for the new
power against the degree to which the exercise of that power will
interfere with another branch's "core functions." For example, if

ferent standards of review, because although all legislation discriminates in some fashion,
some forms of discrimination are less acceptable than others. Laws that discriminate on the
basis of race are the least acceptable and therefore "are subjected to strict scrutiny and will
be sustained only if they are suitably tailored to serve a compelling state interest." City of
Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985). On the other hand, the Court
will subject statutes that classify by gender to an intermediate standard of scrutiny, such
that the classification "must serve important governmental objectives and must be substantially related to achievement of those objectives." Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976).
Finally, the Court will uphold legislation that differentiates on the basis of nonsuspect criteria as long as the legislation is "rationally related to a legitimate governmental purpose."
City of Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 446.
170. See supra notes 161-68 and accompanying text.
171. The Constitution vests the power to appoint ambassadors exclusively in the President; Congress' role in such matters is limited to "the Advice and Consent of the Senate."
U.S. CoNsT. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
172. This is my own phrase, based on the Court's use of the expression "strict scrutiny."
See supra note 169. Similarly, I call analysis under the functionalist tier "functional
scrutiny."
173. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 638 (1952) (Jackson, J.,
concurring).
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the Vice President seeks to participate in all Senate votes, 174 functional scrutiny will be appropriate, weighing the executive branch's
need for the vote against the degree to which this will impair Congress' core function.
Two Tiers and the Admtntstrattve State
In addition to establishing order out -of the Court's seemingly
haphazard jurisprudence in separation of powers, the two-tier system allows formalism to coexist with the administrative state m a
principled manner. No longer will the Court have to resort to judicial inventions such as the "fourth branch"' 5 or "quasi-legislative
agency"'716 and the constitutional dangers such invention engenders. 177 Moreover, the Court will no longer be forced to carve out
an "administrative state exception" in its formalist opinions 7 8 to
protect administrative agencies in a blatant display of result-ori17 9
ented jurisprudence.
Under two tiers, functionalist analysis will be the appropriate
standard of review for most laws concerning administrative agencies, because most such laws involve delegations of power away
from the legislative branch. As long as the Court continues to characterize administrative and independent agencies as part of the executive branch, 180 it may permit an agency to exercise executive,
legislative, and judicial powers simultaneously, unless that exercise
would be so extensive as to disrupt the core functions of another
branch. Under the two-tier system, therefore, the Court can discard the fourth-branch/quasi-legislature fiction,' 8 ' and it can pro-

174. The Constitution permits the Vice President to vote with the Senate only when it is
equally divided. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 4.
175. Strauss, supra note 6, at 495.
176. Humphrey's Ex'r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 628 (1935).
177. See supra notes 42-50 and accompanying text (discussing the loss of accountability
that could result from the insulation of independent agencies from control by elected

officials).
178. See supra notes 29-30 and accompanying text.
179. See supra note 50.
180. Administrative agency heads are generally appointed and subject to removal by the
President. Krent, supra note 46, at 72.
181. See Bruff, supra note 39, at 499 (stating that in Humphrey's Executor v. United
States, 295 U.S. 602 (1935), "the Court distinguished independent from executive agencies
on the basis of a functional difference that does not exist").
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tect the administrative state from formal scrutiny, which is almost
always fatal.
The Two Tiers in Practice
Although the Court has not explicitly recognized the two-tier approach in separation of powers, its cases have in fact been remarkably consistent with this theory Essentially, when Congress has
tried to expand its own powers beyond those expressly enumerated
in the Constitution, its actions have been subjected to formal scrutiny When Congress has merely delegated away its power to another branch, with no corresponding benefit to itself, the Court has
used functional scrutiny, weighing the benefits of the aggrandizement against the potential threat to the other branches' core
functions.
A review of the Court's separation-of-powers cases in the context
of the two-tier framework will demonstrate that the Court has
been implicitly using a two-tier approach all along; it has looked at
which branch has been aggrandized in order to select the appropriate tier of scrutiny
Formalist Cases
The common thread of cases in which the Court has used formalist scrutiny is that they all involved legislative aggrandizement.
In three of the cases, Congress sought to aggrandize itself by assuming executive powers. First, in Myers v. United States,8 2 by
requiring Senate consent for the President to dismiss a postmaster, 8" Congress sought to acquire an active role in removing executive officials. The Court deemed that removing executive officers
was an executive power, thus Congress was aggrandizing itself by
usurping the executive's power in the absence of express authorization by the Constitution.1 8 The Court properly used formalist
analysis in striking down the legislative action.
Second, in Buckley v. Valeo, 8 5 Congress sought to give itself the
power to appoint members of the Federal Election Commission, an
182.
183.
184.
185.

272 U.S. 52 (1926).
Id. at 106-07.
Id. at 161.
424 U.S. 1 (1976).
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executive body I'6 Because Congress was aggrandizing itself by giving itself the appointment power that the Constitution grants exclusively to the President, the Court applied formalist analysis,
8
striking down the statute.1
Third, Bowsher v. Synar'8 8 involved a legislative attempt to acquire the power to remove the Comptroller General for good
cause. 8 9" Because the Comptroller General was an executive officer,
Congress would be acquiring the ability to remove an executive officer without going through impeachment procedures.190 Therefore,
the Court subjected the statute to formalist analysis and invalidated the Act.' 91
The Court's other three formalist cases concerned attempts by
Congress to exceed the powers expressly granted it by the Constitution. In Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v. Marathon Pipe
Line Co.,' 92 a plurality of the Court struck down a legislative
scheme that, inter alia, appointed bankruptcy judges for fixed
terms.' 3 Because the Constitution requires life tenure for Article
III judges, once the plurality found bankruptcy courts to be Article
III courts, formalism was the proper method of analysis; Congress
was aggrandizing itself by giving itself a power over federal judges'
tenures that was not permitted by the Constitution.'
INS v. Chadha'95 involved an immigration statute containing a
legislative veto that would go into effect upon approval by only one
House of Congress. 9 6 Through the legislative veto, Congress was
attempting to give itself the power to enact legislation without go97
ing through all of the procedures required by the Constitution.

186. Id. at 140-41.
187. Id. at 143.
188. 478 U.S. 714 (1986).
189. Id. at 728.
190. "[T]he Constitution explicitly provides for removal of Officers of the United States
by Congress only upon impeachment by the House of Representatives and conviction by the
Senate." Id. at 723.
191. Id. at 734.
192. 458 U.S. 50 (1982).
193. Id. at 87.
194. Id. at 60.
195. 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
196. Id. at 923.
197. Id. at 951.
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Faced with such legislative aggrandizement, the Court correctly
used formalist analysis to strike down the statute.
Similarly, m Metropolitan Washington Airports Authority v.
Citizens for the Abatement of Aircraft Noise, Inc.,19 s the Court
struck down a legislative veto contained m a congressional delegation of power to a state compact. 199 Although the legislative veto
was aimed at state actions (whereas it was tied to executive action
in Chadha)the Court held that Chadha'srationale still controlled;
permitting Congress to use legislative vetoes was tantamount to
permitting Congress to enact legislation without following procedures required by the Constitution. 0 0 In the face of such potential
aggrandizement of Congress, the Court properly applied formal
scrutiny
Functionalist Cases
In the Court's functionalist cases, determining whether Congress
is aggrandizing itself is often more difficult. This question frequently turns on whether Congress is assuming a power that it
must affirmatively exercise, or whether it is merely limiting another branch's powers. For example, in Humphrey's Executor v.
United States, 20 1 Congress was not seeking an active role in the
supervision of an agency official. Unlike in Myers v. United
States20 2 the President needed no affirmative action by Congress
to exercise his executive powers. Rather, Congress sought only to
qualify the President's executive power by requiring him to have a
good reason for removing an agency officer.20 3 Congress did not aggrandize itself, because it acquired no new powers as a result of
this legislation; thus functionalist analysis was appropriate.0 4 Because the limitation on the President's removal power did not un198.
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.

111 S. Ct. 2298 (1991).
Id. at 2301.
Id. at 2312.
295 U.S. 602 (1935).
272 U.S. 52 (1926); see supra text accompanying notes 182-84.
Humphrey's Executor, 295 U.S. at 619.

204. One could argue that "any dimunition of the power of the presidency must be
deemed ipso facto an aggrandizement of the power of 'its primary competitor,' the Congress." Dudley, supra note 10, at 268 (quoting In re Sealed Case, 838 F.2d 476, 509 (D.C.
Cir.), rev'd sub nom. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988)). The Court, however, m determining whether legislative aggrandizement exists, has chosen to focus only on whether Con-
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duly interfere with his ability to execute the laws, the Court upheld the statute. 0 5
06
In many ways, Nixon v. Administrator of General Services
paralleled Humphrey's Executor Congress was again seeking to
limit the President's executive powers, 0 7 but in so doing was not
aggrandizing itself by granting itself powers not explicitly enumerated in the Constitution. The appropriate standard of review
therefore was functional scrutiny, and under that standard, the
Court upheld the statute, stating that the President's ability to execute the laws had not been fundamentally affected.20 s
Continuing the functionalist trend, the Court held in Morrison v.
Olson20 9 that the Constitution permitted Congress to create an independent prosecutor. 210 Although Congress limited the executive
branch's power to remove the independent prosecutor,2 11 Congress
had not otherwise aggrandized itself because it did not retain the
powers to investigate and prosecute.
Another line of functionalist cases involved the delegation of
power by Congress. Because in these cases Congress gained no
supraconstitutional powers through its delegation, and the only aggrandized branch was the executive or judiciary, functional scrutiny was appropriate. For example, in Commodity Futures Trading Commission v. Schor,1 the Court used functional scrutiny to
uphold a statute authorizing an administrative agency to adjudicate claims commonly heard by judicial courts. 213 Because Congress was delegating adjudicative power to an administrative
agency-increasing the powers of the executive branch, but not aggrandizing itself-functional scrutiny was appropriate.

gress has given itself an affirmative role in determining whether there has been legislative
aggrandizement. Id.
205. Humphrey's Executor, 295 U.S. at 631.
206. 433 U.S. 425 (1977).
207. Id. at 429.
208. Id. at 450.
209. 487 U.S. 654 (1988).
210. Id. at 660.
211. Id. at 663.
212. 478 U.S. 833 (1986).
213. See id. at 857.
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Similarly, Mistretta v. United States214 employed functional
scrutiny to examine Congress' delegation of its rulemaking power
to a body partially comprised of sitting federal judges.2 1 5 Because
the delegation merely authorized a body other than Congress to
make the guidelines, while generating no reciprocal benefit for
Congress, functionalist analysis was the appropriate standard of
review.
A third type of functionalist case did not involve legislative action at all, but was more concerned with usurpations by the other
branches. Although the majority opinion in Youngstown Sheet &
Tube Co. v. Sawyer 16 was clearly formalist, Justice Jackson's concurrence, 217 using a functionalist approach, is of greater importance
to the two-tier scheme. Functional scrutiny was appropriate because the executive branch, and not the legislature, was seeking to
aggrandize itself. Even under the less strict standard of functionalism, Justice Jackson held that the President's action was unconstitutional because permitting the President to make the very laws he
was charged with executing would disrupt one of the legislative
218
branch's core functions.
Justice Jackson's concurrence was also significant because it
demonstrated that functional scrutiny is not merely a "rubber
stamp" for governmental action. Although functional scrutinylike rational review in equal protection jurisprudence-is a more
forgiving standard of review than formal scrutiny, governmental
21 9
action will not always be upheld when the Court applies it.
CONCLUSION

The Supreme Court should explicitly adopt a two-tier standard
of review for separation-of-powers cases. The Court has implicitly
employed this methodology all along, applying formal scrutiny
when Congress aggrandized itself and using functional scrutiny
when Congress aggrandized another branch of government or when
214.
215.
216.
217.
218.
219.
review

488 U.S. 361 (1989).
Id. at 368.
343 U.S. 579 (1952).
Id. at 634 (Jackson, J., concurring).
See id. at 637-40.
Cf. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 450 (1985) (using rational
to strike down a statute that discriminated against the mentally retarded).
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another branch aggrandized itself. The two-tier standard recognizes that either formalism or functionalism alone is rife with
problems. Neither method, used exclusively, can provide the flexibility required by the complexities of modern government and adequately protect the principle of separation of powers. Used together, however, in a principled fashion, formalism and functionalism endow the Court with a useful tool for analyzing separation-of-powers problems.
Timothy T Hut

